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consensus  in  favor of  the equality principle. Among the other distribution prin-
ciples envisaged, need came in first. These results are little affected by social or 
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What principles do children mobilize to arrive at a fair distribution? 
Development of the sense of distributive justice in children has been the focus of 
numerous studies since the pioneering work of Piaget (1932). According to Piaget 
and, subsequently, Selman and Damon (1975), or Enright et al. (1984), moral judg-
ment develops gradually in the child following a certain number of stages: justice 
is first (before the age of 6) defined with respect to self or based on physical attri-
butes or in terms of obedience to a recognized authority such as parents; then it 
refers to a notion of strict equality (6-10 year olds) and finally to notions of equity 
(around 10 and older); equity consists notably in giving more to those who 
deserve more or to those who have more need. This outlook dominated the field 
of research in psychology until the 1990s, a decade that saw the development of 
models attributing a central role to the child’s socialization (Grusec et al., 2000; 
Hoffman, 2001; Kuczynski and Navara, 2006) and those that held human beings 
are naturally predisposed to justice, a predisposition acquired over the course of 
the species’ evolution (Haidt, 2008; Lapsley and Carlo, 2014).
The latter perspective considers that human beings are innately disposed 
to favor merit (Liénard et al., 2013). However this does not explain why very 
young children often prefer to opt for equal distribution among the different 
contributors (Baumard et al., 2012). Nor does it consider the representation 
children have of the distribution situations (Bosisio, 2008); yet, as we shall see, 
children endorse certain principles of justice for fairly different reasons.
With these questions in mind, the present study aims at looking at the way 
children understand sharing situations after performing a task together; to do 
this, it adopts the postulate that children choose a distribution principle for 
good reasons (Boudon, 2003), which we will attempt to elucidate, but also on 
the basis of the representations they have of this principle (Emler, Ohana and 
Dickinson, 1990; Duveen and Lloyd, 1990; Duveen and De Rosa, 1992), which 
we will also attempt to clarify. We will therefore ask ourselves how children 
conceive of “equality”, “merit” or “need”.
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Some studies have shown that these justice norms are far from univocal 
(Barreiro, 2013; Kellerhals et al., 1991; Nisan, 1984, 1989) and that children 
are socialized to these principles differently depending on the values found in 
their community as well as the more or less collective practices adopted there. 
Other research shows that children may adopt the same principle of justice, for 
example equality, but for very different reasons: because their performances 
were all comparable or because a different distribution of resources could have 
consequences for group harmony (Carson and Banuazizi, 2008). In our work 
we look at these plural conceptions of justice called upon by children.
The way children perceive the situation also depends on the image they have 
of themselves and of others as well as social expectations placed on them. Are 
girls more willing to share than boys, in accordance with gendered social expec-
tations which associate feminine behavior with “prosociality”? The literature 
yields relatively contrasting findings on this question (Gummerum, et al., 2008, 
2010; Benenson et al., 2007; Pilgrim and Rueda-Riedle, 2002). In turn, does the 
sex of the beneficiary influence the child’s generosity to him/her? Very few 
studies have tackled this question. One study by Barnett and Andrews (1977) 
finds no difference, while others show that adolescents give more to a deser-
ving boy than to a deserving girl (Olejnik et al., 1982). The present experimental 
study will also address this question.
Context as well comes into the way children define the distributive situa-
tion. Certain studies show they opt for equality over merit in situations where 
they are sharing with their friends, while they prefer merit when it comes to 
simple acquaintances or strangers (Frederickson and Simmonds, 2008; Pilgrim 
and Rueda-Riedle, 2002; McGillicuddy-De Lisi and Watkins, 1994). Still, nume-
rous studies show that children under the age of 9 show little sensitivity to 
context and share equally whatever the situation (Frederickson and Simmonds, 
2008; McGillicuddy-De Lisi and Watkins, 1994; Pataki et al., 1994). But do they 
opt for equality because they consider it to be the fairest principle, or is this the 
only norm of justice they are acquainted with and know how to practice? The 
previous experimental set-ups used do not allow us to answer this question. 
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That is why, in our study, we honed the investigation by inciting the children 
to rank the different distributive justice principles.
In this regard, it seems that it is especially in experimental contexts where 
children are asked to have objects distributed by another instance (a doll, for 
instance), that they opt for egalitarian distribution whereas, when sharing has 
a personal cost, they instead tend, before the age of 7-8, to favor themselves 
(Fehr et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2013). It thus seems that they adopt a very different 
viewpoint depending on their personal involvement in the distribution game, but 
there is, to our knowledge, no study that consists in having them vary their posi-
tion, sometimes taking the role of the third party, sometimes that of beneficiary, 
to explore how the change of position may have affected the children’s represen-
tation of the situation. This will therefore be another aim of our research.
Since children rarely elaborate their judgments in complete social isolation, 
it seemed important to include peer judgment in our study. To what extent may 
friends influence the child’s point of view on the situation? Can they lead the 
youngest children to envisage distribution principles other than strict equality? 
If certain studies have looked into the way social environment can affect distri-
butive behaviors (Leimgruber et al., 2012; Piazza and Bering, 2008), none, to 
our knowledge, have sought to analyze the effects of the explicit opinions of 
friends on the stability of children’s distributive judgment.
Last of all, very few experiments have taken into account the effect of social 
background on sharing behaviors. Most simply mention that the participants 
are from “middle-class” backgrounds and pay little attention to the possible 
effects of these children being from one background or another on sharing 
situations. As for the rare studies that take into account social origin, they come 
up with contrasting findings (Benenson et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2013). We are 
therefore seeking to fill this gap by studying how family socialization (broken 
down by parents’ occupation) can influence choice of a justice principle.
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Furthermore, we will be looking at a variable neglected in earlier research: 
the child’s position in the school environment (good, average or poor pupil). 
We posit that school performance has an impact not only on the way children 
understand and make use of their knowledge in the situation they are presented 
with but also on the way they value some criteria of fairness rather than others. 
From this standpoint, it can be expected that children perceive fair compensation 
differently depending on the way they themselves are compensated at school.
1. METHODOLOGY
Between December 2012 and June 2013 we carried out a study of 169 
French children between the ages of 6 and 10 years (the sample is described in 
the Annexes), attending four primary schools in four Parisian suburbs which 
had the following characteristics:
a) a state-funded private primary school in which the upper class and, to a 
lesser extent, the middle class are over-represented;
b) a state school where the working-class categories are over-represented 
but with numerous middle-class categories as well;
c) a state school where working-class categories are over-represented;
d) a state school where social categories are mixed with none being clearly 
over-represented.
Short individual interviews (9 minutes on average) were conducted with 
the children at school, during class time or recess. The child was first shown a 
drawing of four children (see Annexes for an example) with cookies in front of 
them and a sac with biscuits or fruit for the afternoon snack. It was explained 
that these children together had made twelve cookies and now they were to 
share them among the four children, each of whom had a characteristic clearly 
commented on by the interviewer as follows:
The first (A) is the strongest.
The second (B) is fondest of food.
The third (C) made the most cakes.
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The fourth (D), unlike the others, has nothing in his sack for the afternoon 
snack and therefore will have nothing to eat but the cookies made with the 
other children.
We see that A corresponds to what most theories of justice consider to be 
an arbitrary principle, such as strength or size, B to a utility principle, C to a 
principle of merit, and D to a principle of need.
In addition, the sex of the children in the drawing varied, half of the chil-
dren interviewed being presented with drawings of children in a single-sex 
group of the same sex as the interviewee (group of girls for the girls / group 
of boys for the boys), the other half being presented with drawings of a 
mixed group of children (2 boys [A and C] and 2 girls [B and D] for the boys 
interviewed; and 2 girls [A and C] and 2 boys [B and D] for the girls inter-
viewed). The task was of course to evaluate the way gender intervened in the 
perception of sharing situations.
The interviewer would then give the child 12 identical tokens and ask him 
or her to imagine these were the cookies made by the children, and tell the child 
to distribute the tokens, as he or she wished, among the children in the drawing 
(the child was to place the tokens directly on the figures in the drawing). The 
child was also asked to explain the reason for this distribution. 
Each time the child’s distribution did not yield an overall ranking of the 
children in the drawing (therefore partial or total equality among them), the 
interviewer would provide an additional token so as to prompt the child to 
rank the different justice principles.
When this task was completed, the child was asked once again to share out 
the 12 tokens among the four children in the drawing, but this time changing 
the child’s position with regard to the distribution situation. This time the inter-
viewer would tell the child he/she was one of the beneficiaries of the distribu-
tion. He was now the little boy (versus the little girl) in the drawing who had 
been given the fewest cookies (but without telling him/her this was the reason). 
In the event of equal distribution, the interviewer randomly gave the child the 
place of one of the children in the drawing. Again the child would be asked first 
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to share out the 12 cookies among the four children in the drawing and, if there 
was partial or total equality, the child would be given additional cookies to distri-
bute (one at a time until an overall ranking was achieved).
Finally, the possible influence of peer judgment on the stability of the 
child’s choices was investigated by asking the child if he/she would distri-
bute the cookies in the same way if his/her best friend told him/her that 
the distribution was questionable (saying, when the choice was for unequal 
distribution, that equality was preferable or, on the contrary, when the choice 
had been equal distribution that it was preferable to favor one or another of 
the characters, rotating the four possible options). The interviewer would 
then ask the child if he/she thought his/her best friend was right, and gave 
the child the choice of making a new distribution, if he/she wished, of the 
cookies previously attributed to the four children in the drawing so as to be 
in line with the eventual change of mind.
In the last part of the interview, the interviewer would talk with the child 
to find out how he/she perceived this distributive situation. She would ask 
the child in particular how he/she interpreted the respective situation of each 
child, in particular that of the child most in need and that of the most deser-
ving. At the end of the interview, the child was thanked for taking part and told 
how important these answers were for the interviewers. 
In addition, a short questionnaire was addressed to the parents of the chil-
dren interviewed. It contained questions on a few socio-demographic variables 
such as occupation, diplomas, number of children in the household, as well as 
political positioning and certain questions concerning the responding parent’s 




The first analyses show that, whatever the distribution of cookies chosen, 
the answers are neither sensitive to the sex of the children in the drawing. Nor 
is there any incidence of a connection between the interviewee’s sex and the 
drawing proposed when the sexes are mixed. The boys did not tend to favor 
boys or girls, the same being true for the girls (whatever the age).
In fact, whatever the sex of the children in the drawing, the distribution 
that comes in first is that corresponding to strict equality (three cookies for 
each child in the drawing). 70% of the children spontaneously choose to apply 
the equality principle. Next, 15% choose the principle of need, giving more 
cookies to D (the most deprived). Then 13% privilege the principle of merit 
by giving C more cookies. The remaining 2% (but that is not more than four 
children) choose the law of “might makes right” (giving more to A) or the 
utility principle, (giving more to B, who, being the one who especially likes 
food, derives the most pleasure from eating cookies, hence the most utility, in 
the classic sense used in economics), as child #93 said “because she likes to 
eat so much she will be able to eat more and will be glad”. It can be noted that 
among those who give more to D, C comes more often in second place (10%) 
than A or B (5%). The spontaneous order of the principles is thus: equality, 
need, merit, then, residually, “others” (strength or pleasure).
It is not easy to determine if this order is sensitive to different criteria 
because the high number of children favoring equality leaves only a few chil-
dren attached to the other principles for a cross-sectional analysis. 
Thus the chi-square of the table (chi-square = 3.03, df =4, p =0.55) cros-
sing age groups with distribution principles is not significant. It is therefore 
not possible to affirm that the equality principle would become less and less 
important with age. The other variables concerning the children do not have a 
significant statistical effect either. This is the case particularly of the children’s 
sex (chi-square = 1.09, df = 2, p = 0.58). The school where the study was 
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conducted comes in slightly, but without going so far as to be frankly signifi-
cant (chi-square = 8.87, df = 6, p = 0.18).
Crossing choice of the justice principle with parents’ occupation does not 
yield very significant figures either (chi-square = 6.03, df = 4, p = 0.20). The 
same is true for the diplomas of the parent answering the questionnaire, and 
for the number of children in the household. Furthermore, the responding 
parent’s political positioning on a scale of 1 (left wing) to 10 (right wing) 
does not have any visible repercussions on the child’s responses. To clarify 
this point, several “classic” questions concerning the importance of the 
different criteria of distributive justice in the workplace or in the country as 
a whole were asked the parents. But no direct effect of parental opinions was 
observed on the children’s responses. 
To sum up: the age, sex, type of school and social background of the chil-
dren, or the responding parent’s political positioning and opinions with regard 
to distributive justice were not discriminating factors in the spontaneous 
choice of a justice principle. 
In this context of inter-category consensus, only school performance inter-
venes significantly (see Table 1). The children who were good pupils had a 
more than average preference for equality. Those who were poor pupils looked 
more willingly to the need principle and those who were average pupils leaned 
more in favor of merit.
The way of achieving equality is nevertheless not the same for all. Children 
who are good pupils use arithmetic and often simply say: “3 x 4 that makes 
exactly 12 (child #29); while the weaker pupils arrive at equality more or less 
by trial and error: “I give each of them one each time round” (child #74).
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Table 1. Choice of justice principles according to school performance
DISTRIBUTION OF COOKIES
TOTAL




Frequency 87 14 13 114
% 76.3% 12.3% 11.4% 100.0%
Average
Frequency 18 3 7 28
% 64.3% 10.7% 25.0% 100.0%
Poor
Frequency 13 8 5 26
% 50.0% 30.8% 19.2% 100.0%
TOTAL
Frequency 118 25 25 168
% 70.2% 14.9% 14.9% 100.0%
Note : chi-square = 10.70, df = 4, p= 0.03.
* C (merit) being in the clear majority (21 children) relative to A or B (4 children).
2.2. RANKING THE PRINCIPLES
Many of the children were not deceived by the procedure of adding a 
token each time the chosen distribution did not allow an overall ranking of 
their priorities. In particular, those who had opted for equality simply cut the 
supplementary token into four equal parts so as to give a quarter to each of the 
children in the drawing. It should be noted that this way of proceeding was not 
suggested beforehand by the interviewer.
Nevertheless, since the question encourages the ranking of the norms of 
justice, the answers going along those lines progress in an altogether logical 
manner (see Table 2). 24% of the children stick to their egalitarian position, 
but 45% give more cookies to the most deprived (D), 19% to the most deser-
ving and 12% to the one fondest of food or to the strongest (the first coming 
before the second). If we look at the average number of cookies distributed, we 
again find the same order: 4.3 for D (need), 3.9 for C (merit), 3.6 for B (utility) 
and 3.4 for A (strength). It should be noted that the order was the same before 
the ranking procedure (3.2 for D, 3.1 for C, 2.9 for B or A), but the very slight 
variance of these figures indicates above all here the clear tendency to prefer 
equality, as we have already pointed out.
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After equality, it is therefore clear that need is the first distribution crite-
rion and that the equity perspective is not completely lacking in children of 
6-10. That being said, “need, merit, utility, strength” already emerged in the 
spontaneous choices, and equality does not disappear following a procedure 
where everything is done to encourage ranking.
If the two distributions (before and after the supplementary cookies) are 
crossed, we see a very strong and highly significant tendency for the children to 
persevere in their first choice (chi-square: 103.75, df = 9, p < 0.0001). Of those 
who spontaneously prefer the criterion of need, 100% continue to give D more 
cookies. 82% of those who tend to favor merit stick to their opinion. Those who 
had opted for equality also tend not to alter their attitude (the degree of freedom 
is positive and highly significant since the adjusted standardized residual is 4.8), 
but if they change their mind (because they have been encouraged to do so), for 
the majority (42%) it will be to give more to the most disadvantaged. We thus 
have a high degree of stability in the answers to the two questions and, if there 
is movement, it goes, in the first place (the most frequent change) from equality 
towards advantaging the one who seems to be the least favored (D).




Frequency % Frequency %
EQUALITY 118 69.8 40 23.7
NEED (D) THEN MERIT (C) 16 9.5 37 21.9
NEED THEN STRENGTH (A) OR GOURMANDISE (B) 9 5.3 40 23.7
MERIT (C) THEN NEED (D) 6 3.5 9 5.3
MERIT THEN STRENGTH (A) OR GOURMANDISE (B) 16 9.5 23 13.6
STRENGTH (A) OR GOURMANDISE (B) 4 2.4 20 11.8
TOTAL 169 100.0 169 100.0
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The differentiating criteria for the children or their parents that might 
explain the second choice ranking are no more significant than the former. 
The differences in assessing fairness are even less clear among the different 
categories of children that can be considered. School performance, which had 
the strongest influence, no longer has any particular effect here. With one 
exception. Age group plays a more important role here (chi-square = 16.89, 
df = 6, p = 0.01), but this is essentially due to the fact that the sense of equa-
lity increases between the ages of 6 and 10. As far as the other principles are 
concerned, evolution according to age is not significant.
2.3. THE ROLE OF PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT
A second way of investigating the stability of the choices made up to this 
point is to invite the child to become personally involved in order to see if this 
may alter the justice principle he/she put in first place.
The results show first of all the same stability as earlier. The earlier spon-
taneous choice and that made when the child is placed in the position of the 
one who received the fewest cookies is almost the same. Spontaneously the 
criterion of equality comes in an easy first (54%), followed by need (20%), then 
merit (14%) and finally utility and strength (12%). After ranking the criteria, we 
see an order identical to the earlier one, even if equality looses 35% of adhe-
sions (but this was constrained by the experiment), in particular to the advan-
tage of the need principle, which gets 43%, while merit rises to 21%, and the 
other principles to 17%. It must be noted moreover that this ordering of distri-
bution principles (before or after adding cookies) applies to all ages. Given the 
possibility of taking more, or at least of being able to balance out their previous 
choices, the children do not take advantage of it. “Because there’s no reason 
I should have more than the others”, as child #108 says, for instance. They 
continue to privilege equality, and when this is no longer (or less) possible, 
need, which is clearly identified as such: “since she doesn’t have anything and 
everyone else has something it’s better to give her one” (child #16).
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The fact that self-interest plays no (or very little) role can be clearly seen 
when analyzing the numbers of cookies attributed on the basis of the place 
assigned to the child. Whatever his/her place (A or B or C or D), the child will 
never on average attribute more cookies to him/her self than to the others. In 
almost all cases that child will even be the one who has the fewest. The same 
thing can be observed, still in terms of average numbers of cookies, when 
comparing spontaneous choice without personal involvement and choice with 
involvement, or ranked choice without involvement and the same choice with 
involvement (see Table 3). Once again we systematically observe (in sponta-
neous or ranked choice) that, whatever the position assigned the child (A or 
B or C or D), this position receives on average fewer cookies than when no 
position was assigned the child. The choice of a justice principle is firm and is 
not, or not very, subject to change due to self-interest.
Table 3. Average number of cookies attributed depending on whether or not the child inter-
viewed is involved in his/her spontaneous or ranked distribution choices
Average number of 
cookies distributed 
to…
SPONTANEOUS CHOICES RANKED CHOICES
Cookies given with 
no involvement
Cookies given 
when the child has 






when the child has 
the role noted in 
row
A 2.92 2.86 3.36 3.19
B 2.88 2.79 3.60 3.26
C 3.15 3.12 3.86 3.58
D 3.18 3.08 4.32 3.51
2.4. INFLUENCE OF FRIENDSHIP
Can the distribution proposed by the children be called into question by a 
friend suggesting a different way of sharing? The answer is a clear “no”, for, if 
7 children (4%) hesitate to form a clear opinion, for the other 63% there is no 
change of opinion, as opposed to 37% who change their mind. The latter are 
found to a significant proportion among those who had given the most cookies 
to the strongest or the one who liked food (adjusted standardized residual = 2.3), 
while those who stuck to their choice, ignoring their friend’s opinion, are prin-
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cipally those who prefer equality (adjusted standardized residual = 2.0). On the 
other hand, the friend’s opposing view has no significant effect (adjusted standar-
dized residuals approaching 0) on those who choose need or merit. The weakest 
criteria (utility or strength) are the most doubted, while the most widespread 
criterion, equality, is not sensitive to the opposing influence of friends.
Few of the characteristics of the children or the parents have an effect on 
change of mind. In particular, the children’s school performance or the parents’ 
occupations play no role here. Alternatively, age has an impact (see Table 4). 
The older the children, the more they tend to stick to their opinion. As this 
opinion is maintained particularly in the choice of equality, it appears that 
equality is a choice that becomes more firm and stable with age.
Table 4. Influence of friends on changing principles of justice 
AFTER FRIEND’S NEGATIVE OPINION,  
THE INTERVIEWED CHILD …
changes principles doesn’t change principles Total
AGE
6 years
Frequency 22 22 44
% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
Adjusted residual 2.2 -2.2
8 years
Frequency 24 39 63
% 38.1% 61.9% 100.0%
Adjusted residual .3 -.3
10 years
Frequency 13 41 54
% 24.1% 75.9% 100.0%
Adjusted residual -2.4 2.4
TOTAL
Frequency 59 102 161
% 36.6% 63.4% 100.0%
Note : chi-square = 7.1, df = 2, p= 0.03.
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2.5. THE CHILDREN’S REPRESENTATIONS AND REASONS
Verbatim analysis highlights multiple conceptions of sharing and reasons 
advanced for arriving at the chosen distribution. Sharing can also mean giving 
less to oneself than to others—“because I want to be generous” (child #145)—or, 
on the contrary, attributing more to oneself—“I prefer to give it to myself and 
(then) share with someone” (child #55). Sharing is also giving to those who have 
nothing. But the definition of sharing is often associated with “giving everyone 
the same thing”—“we share equally” (child #123). It is also an activity that takes 
some thinking “because it’s a little bit hard” (child #140), “because there are 
lots of ways of sharing” (child #118). That is why some children consider the 
best thing to do is to rely on chance “it’s hard, I just go plop, plop” (child #144). 
Sharing is also “giving to each person, each in their turn” (child #74), and 
for the older children and the better students, a mathematical operation—“the 
better you are in math the better you can share” (child #112). Sharing is there-
fore by definition egalitarian, and pure equality is the only guarantee of fairness 
(“I share equally… like that it’s not unfair to anyone”, child #132), insofar as it 
avoids jealousy (“it’s better for everyone to have the same share of cookies so no 
one will be jealous”, child #110), which risks creating frustration (“otherwise 
the others are going to be mad”, child #105), or quarrels (“everyone has to be 
equal, like that there won’t be any fighting”, child #52), which compromises 
creating trust (“they aren’t going to be friends”, child #13) and damages group 
cohesion (“since they made the cookies together, they all have to get the same 
reward”, child #157), for the main thing is to have participated (“we all have the 
right to the same thing, the main thing is to have worked”, child #82).
This analysis of the children’s discourses also reveals the way the children 
attribute meaning to the situation. In particular, many chose to give to the “most 
deprived” and to a lesser extent to the child who contributed the most. The post-
distribution interview was thus devoted to exploring the children’s perception 
of the situation of these two figures. What happened to them? Two main types 
of explanation appear for the most in need. For some, he is less well off due to 
structural reasons, for example because his parents are poor: “maybe it’s because 
his family doesn’t have the money to buy him food” (child #163). Others evoke 
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more temporary reasons. For example, he is absent-minded and left the cookies 
his parents had prepared at home: “he forgot everything at home” (child #150). 
We see a slight tendency to favor D (the most deprived) when the reasons for 
his lack of cookies are considered to be more structural than temporary: “we 
should give her more because she doesn’t have anything… because her parents 
don’t have enough money” (child #110). In addition, some children, perceiving 
the two possibilities, structural and temporary, prefer when in doubt to consider 
the worst situation D might find himself/herself in the better to justify their 
favoritism: “either it’s because she didn’t want them, or because she doesn’t 
have enough money. OK, let’s say she doesn’t have enough money” (child #169). 
Finally, some children tend to attribute the responsibility for the situation to 
the needy child him/her self: “because he didn’t work hard” (child #141). The 
person who produced the most is also apprehended in a number of ways by the 
child: he/she is seen as either someone more intelligent or more motivated, or 
as someone who is especially fond of cookies or of working hard, or as someone 
who practiced or had help from his/her parents (who taught him/her to make 
cookies), or as someone who “always want’s to be the best” (child #134).
3. DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to understand how children interpret distributive 
situations and use their knowledge in situation to think sharing among persons 
with variable characteristics referring to different principles of justice. It shows 
first of all that the great majority of children opt for equality by giving each 
character, whatever their situation, the same number of cookies. This prefe-
rence does not regress with age and is not affected by the child’s gender or social 
background or the type of school they attend. Nor does it vary with the child’s 
involvement in the distribution game. Contrary to what earlier studies seem to 
suggest, when the children were given the possibility to benefit personally by 
involving them in the situation, all, even the youngest, persisted in their desire 
to share out the same thing to each. This preference for equality also resists peer 
influence, since most of the children faced with a diverging opinion persist in 
their initial choice. Furthermore, when incited to give up equality by ranking 
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competing principles of justice, a good number maintain their egalitarian distri-
bution. The choice of equality turns out to be not only massive but also highly 
stable depending on the context and the position with regard to sharing. This 
no doubt explains that no difference is observed in the children’s responses in 
relation to the mixed or non-mixed gender of the group in the drawing.
But the verbatim analysis shows that the children are far from having 
chosen equality for the same reasons. For some, it is the best way of keeping 
harmony within the group. This is the argument already recorded by Carson 
and Banuazizi (2008). For others, the choice of equality is self-evident: it is 
the very definition of sharing. Lastly, for the youngest children, who, as one 
might expect, express their difficulties in putting other principles in practice, 
it seems that it is the simplest way of distributing the resources. Nevertheless, 
when the study seeks to question the children beyond their initial response, by 
inciting them to come up with a second principle for sharing out the resources, 
the youngest like the oldest often choose to give more to the child who “has 
the least”. Here we discover that children 6 to 10 years of age do not sponta-
neously choose equality uniquely for practical reasons but that they are also 
capable, at this age already, of choosing in favor of this norm. They clearly prefer 
to share equally, but they are also capable of mobilizing the criterion of need, 
even if it only comes in second. Moreover, this is in line with certain recent 
studies, which show that children (6-8 years old), when faced with a situation 
of inequality, attempt to correct these inequalities (Shaw and Olson, 2013) and 
that, contrary to some claims, primary-school children manage to make clear 
distinctions between different norms of justice (Dubet, 1999).
Sharing therefore does not simply mean “sharing alike”. For many children 
it also means “giving to the one who has nothing”, distributing on the basis 
of another norm, that of need. The latter is not a univocal principle, however. 
The children propose substantially different interpretations of the situation of 
the child without an afternoon snack, which influences the way they decide to 
allocate resources. The structural rather than the temporary explanation leads 
them to give this character more cookies. No doubt this explanation, which 
implies a minimal ability to represent social differences, is mobilized more 
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by the older children from upper-class backgrounds (Zarca, 1999), but this 
hypothesis must be handled with caution because of the small numbers in the 
study, which do not allow statistical verification.
How to explain the fact that the children willingly choose equality 
over merit? And in second place need over the other principles? A study by 
McGillicuddy-De Lisi and Watkins (1994), in which the children give more to 
the character with the greatest need when it is a friend rather than a stranger, 
offers a future line of interpretation. We can suppose that, in the absence of 
specific information on the relations between the characters in the picture, 
most of the children assumed they were classmates. The explicit references to 
friendship or school life in the children’s verbatim go in this sense. And we 
know that this context is conducive to espousing equality or need over merit.
In any case, the situation used to test the influence of friends turns out to 
be pertinent for investigating judgment stability in children. It makes it possible 
to see that the child’s judgment develops with age and that younger children 
are not very confident of their choices, especially when these are in the mino-
rity. The test nevertheless has its limits and does not allow us to study the 
negotiations between children, which would certainly not fail to occur if the 
friend were really present, as certain studies show (Birch and Billman, 1986). 
More research, in a more “ecological setting”, is therefore needed to study the 
influence of peer judgment on children’s distributive behavior.
But beyond the consensus in favor of equality—and in second place in favor 
of need—our study shows that the children’s responses vary with their school 
performance. Good pupils favor equality more than the others, those who are 
average more readily look to merit, and the weakest pupils emphasize need. 
These results invite looking more closely at the way the children apprehended the 
meaning of the task they were asked to perform. As the verbatim analysis shows, 
the best pupils often turned it into a mathematical problem. They sought to show 
that they were capable of dividing the number of cookies and that they knew 
their multiplication tables (“I did 4 x 3”)—and therefore were more ready to opt 
for an egalitarian distribution. The other pupils sought to distribute the cookies as 
they usually do among friends, giving them out one by one until none were left.
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Can these differences in adhesion to justice principles according to school 
performance be interpreted in part by different socializations within the family 
to these principles? In fact, school performance correlates closely, in France in 
particular, with social background (Duru-Bellat and Henriot-Van Zanten, 2012).1 
And in our study we find the same connection between the children’s school 
performance and their parents’ occupations (chi-square  =  17.9, df  =  4, 
p = 0.001). Yet the different criteria of fairness can vary with the socio-profes-
sional group, even if they tend, on the whole, to be ranked in the same order 
(Forsé and Parodi, 2009). But to advance more surely in this line of interpre-
tation, perhaps we need to ask the parents other questions about social justice 
that are less centered than in the case of our questionnaire on reward for work 
or on the global distribution of revenues in France. We would also have to be 
able to look beyond the family and take into account other forms of children’s 
socialization, in particular by teachers or other professional staff (e.g. activity 
leaders). In other words, this interpretation of the role of school performance 
through the lens of children’s socialization remains to be explored further.
More specifically, school performance refers to a perception, no doubt 
contrasting, of fair compensation with respect to the way the children feel 
they have been rewarded in school for the efforts they have made. The major 
international studies on the sense of justice or fairness in adolescent students 
show that, in France particularly, poor students feel they are treated more 
unfairly by their teachers than do good students (Desvignes and Meuret, 2009; 
Friant et al., 2008).2 Furthermore, the poorest students emphasize, more than 
the others, the need in school to help the less “gifted” (Gorard, 2007). The 
poorer pupils in our study, unlike the others, were clearly more attentive to a 
criterion that seemed fairer to them than the one by which they were regularly 
evaluated in school. But other studies on the sense of justice in school, among 






At any rate, this study shows the benefits of an analysis of the sense of 
distributive justice in children focused on their representations while taking 
into account the reasons they mobilize to think sharing situations, in particu-
lar with regard to their experience at school.
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The study was carried out between December 2012 and June 2013 in four primary 
schools in four Parisian suburbs. The sample had the following characteristics:
CITY/SCHOOL FREQUENCY % DATE OF INTERVIEW
Alpha 33 19.5 December 2012
Beta 47 27.8 February 2013
Gamma 30 17.8 May 2013






SCHOOL GRADE FREQUENCY % AVERAGE AGE
First 44 26.0 6.2
Third 69 40.8 8.3
Fifth 56 33.1 10.3
Total 169 100.0 8.4
2. Example of a drawing shown to the children
